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By David E. Aaronson
and Julia M. Fox
Mistaken eyewitness identifications played
the primary role in 236 of the 329 (72 percent) post-conviction DNA exonerations in the
United States, according to Innocence Project
statistics, making it the number one cause
of wrongful convictions. The real perpetrators were apprehended in 159 of these cases.
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-falseimprisonment/front-page#c10=published&b_
start=0&c4=Exonerated+by+DNA (last visited
Mar. 22, 2015). Since only a fraction of criminal
cases involve biological evidence that can be
subject to DNA testing, most wrongfully convicted persons have little chance of proving
their innocence. Wrongful convictions based on
mistaken eyewitness identifications are especially serious for racial minorities, who make
up approximately 70 percent of the wrongfully
convicted. Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Dangers of
Eyewitnesses for the Innocent: Learning from
the Past and Projecting into the Age of Social
Media, 46 New Eng. L. Rev. 769, 770 (2012).
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Maryland is not exempt from eyewitness misidentification. In this
state, Kirk Bloodsworth became the
first man to be exonerated after being
sentenced to death. At the age of
22, Bloodsworth was arrested after
an anonymous call suggested that
he was responsible for the rape and
murder of a young girl. Although no
physical evidence tied Bloodworth
to the murder, witnesses testified
that they had seen him with the victim. Bloodsworth spent nine years in
prison before he was released based
on DNA evidence. Kirk Bloodsworth,
Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/kirk-bloodsworth (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
Other examples of wrongful convictions based on eyewitness identifications in Maryland include Larry
Lane Hugee, who was arrested for
the robbery of a Dollar Tree. Hugee,
who had prior convictions for theft
and possession of a weapon, had
been questioned by police in the
strip mall where Dollar Tree was
located about a week prior to the
robbery. Police put Hugee’s photograph into a photographic lineup,
and although the robber’s face was
covered with a ski mask during the
commission of the crime, witnesses
identified Hugee as the robber. Larry
Lane Hugee, the National Registry
of Exonerations, http://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/
pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4172
(last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
Jerry Jenkins was another
Maryland victim of witness misidentification who was falsely imprisoned for rape. Jenkins, who was
being held in Charles County Jail
following his arrest for an unrelated
crime, was interviewed in relation
to the rape. Despite having taken
28
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a photo during their interview of
Jenkins, police put a five-year-old
photograph of him into a photographic array, resulting in the victim
saying he “looked like” the attacker.
Although at trial, the victim said she
could not positively identify Jenkins,
he was convicted and spent approximately 26 years in prison. Jerry
Lee Jenkins, the National Registry
of Exonerations, http://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4191
(last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
These stories and others demonstrate the need to re-evaluate current
eyewitness identification procedures
in Maryland to help reduce wrongful
convictions.

The Need for Additional
Safeguards to Reduce the
Likelihood of Wrongful
Convictions Based on
Mistaken Eyewitness
Identification(s)
There is an emerging consensus, including within the
U.S. Department of Justice, the
National Research Council of the
National Academies of Sciences
(Identifying the Culprit: Assessing
Eyewitness Identification, 2014), and
the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (National Summit
on Wrongful Convictions: Building a
Systemic Approach to Prevent Wrongful
Convictions, August 2013), that recognizes the need and importance of
additional safeguards to reduce the
likelihood of mistaken eyewitness
identifications. These reforms need
to be initiated through state courts
and legislatures, rather than rely on
federal intervention.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an 8-1
decision in Perry v. New Hampshire,

565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012),
affirmed a defendant’s conviction for
breaking into a car in a parking lot.
Defendant alleged that the circumstances surrounding his identification were suggestive because, among
other things, the eyewitness had
identified him while he was standing
next to a police officer in the parking lot. Resolving a conflict among
federal and state courts, the Court
held that a trial judge is not required
under the Due Process Clause to conduct a preliminary assessment of “the
reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not
procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by
law enforcement.” Id. at 730.
The Court in Perry reaffirmed the
holdings of its earlier cases, especially
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct.
375 (1972) and Manson v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977).
Under these cases, the Due Process
Clause does not require that an identification infected by improper police
influence be automatically excluded.
“If the indicia of reliability are strong
enough to outweigh the corrupting
effect of the police-arranged suggestive circumstances,” then the pretrial “identification evidence ordinarily will be admitted and the jury
will ultimately determine its worth.”
Perry, at 720. Trial courts often follow
a two-step procedure: (1) “whether the police used an unnecessarily
suggestive identification procedure”;
and (2) “if they did,… whether [that]
procedure so tainted the resulting
identification as to render it unreliable and thus inadmissible.” Id. at
722. Maryland follows this two-step
procedure. See Chambers v. State, 81
Md. App. 210, 567 A.2d 458 (1989).
Even when the pre-trial identification
is found to be inadmissible due to its

suggestive nature, if the subsequent
in-court identification is not a product of the tainted identification, but
is based on an independent source
such as a clear view of the suspect
at the occurrence of the crime, the-in
court identification may be admitted. See, e.g., Foster v. State 272 Md.
273, 323 A.2d 419 (1974).In Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243
(1997), the Supreme Court provided
a list of “factors to weigh against the
corrupting effect of a suggestive identification,” including: opportunity to
view, degree of attention, accuracy
of the description, witness’s level of
certainty, and time between the crime
and confrontation. Id. at 114-16, 97 S.
Ct. at 2253-54.

In Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting
opinion in Perry, she stated that it
is not merely the suggestive act that
creates a Due Process concern, but
the effect of a suggestive act on the
reliability of a resulting identification. Perry, at 731. Conduct that is
intentionally suggestive or inadvertently suggestive can lead to the same
unfair result. Referring to the numerous scientific studies on the topic of
reliability of eyewitness identifications, she stated: “Over the past three
decades, more than two thousand
studies related to eyewitness identification have been published. One state
supreme court recently appointed a
special master to conduct an exhaustive survey of the current state of

the scientific evidence and concluded that ‘(t)he research…is not only
extensive’ but ‘it represents the gold
standard in terms of the applicability
of social science research to law,’” Id.
at 738 (citing State v. Henderson, 208
N.J. 208, 283, 27 A.3d 872, 916 (2011)).
At least one state court has rejected
the holding in Perry v. New Hampshire,
supra, on state evidence grounds,
finding that an identification should
not be admitted when it arises from
“especially suggestive circumstances” other than police procedures. In
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass.
228, 21 N.E.3d 157 (2014), the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts
stated: “Our reliance on commonlaw principles of fairness to supJuly 2015
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press an identification made under
‘especially suggestive circumstances’
even where the circumstances did not
result from improper police activity is
also in contrast with the United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence.” Id. at
235, 21 N.E.3d at 165.
State v. Henderson, the landmark
case decided by the Supreme Court
of New Jersey and cited by Justice
Sotomayor in Perry v. New Hampshire,
revised the framework for admission of eyewitness identifications by
“allowing judges to consider all relevant factors that affect reliability in
deciding whether an identification
is admissible” and departing from
a rule that is heavily weighted by
factors that can be affected by suggestiveness. 208 N.J. 208, 288, 27 A.3d
872, 919 (2011). The new test allows
all relevant variables to be explored
at pretrial hearings when there is evidence of suggestiveness, and calls for
courts to develop and use enhanced
jury instructions so that jurors can
evaluate eyewitness identification
evidence properly. Id.
The Oregon Supreme Court, in State
v. Lawson, went further by requiring
Oregon courts to consider all factors
that can affect an eyewitness identification and employ remedies, such as
limiting the eyewitness’s testimony
and permitting expert testimony to
explain the science behind identifications. 352 Or. 724, 761-62, 291 P.3d
673, 697 (2012). It also instructed
trial courts to impose remedies if
the defendant establishes that he/she
would be unfairly prejudiced by the
evidence. Id.
Building on that momentum, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut, in
State v. Guilbert, held that the reliability of eyewitness identifications
is often not a matter that the average
juror is familiar with, and the admis30
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sion of an expert witness on that issue
“does not invade the providence of
the jury to determine what weight
to give evidence.” 306 Conn. 218,
251-52, 49 A.3d 705, 731 (2012). The
Court held that the trial court abused
its discretion by concluding that an
expert witness’s testimony about the
reliability of eyewitness identification concerned matters of common
knowledge. Id. at 259, 49 A.3d at 735.

Pre-trial and Trial
Safeguards to Reduce the
Likelihood of Wrongful
Convictions Based on
Mistaken Eyewitness
Identification(s)
According to Deborah Davis and
Elizabeth Loftus, eyewitness identifications are very rarely suppressed.
Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus,
The Dangers of Eyewitnesses for the
Innocent: Learning from the Past and
Projecting into the Age of Social Media,
46 New Eng. L. Rev. 769, 775-76 (2012).
In New Jersey v. Henderson, supra, the
Report of the Special Master, No.
A-8-08 (June 18, 2010) found only one
New Jersey appellate decision, unreported, that applied the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Manson v. Brathwaite, supra,
test to suppress an eyewitness identification. The Report concluded:
“Because the test allows…a finding
of reliability notwithstanding impermissible suggestiveness, it appears
to be of little value in weeding out
unreliable identifications.” Id. at 78.
There are two viable avenues to
reduce the likelihood and impact of
mistaken eyewitness identifications:
(1) improve pre-trial police procedures to reduce the likelihood that
mistaken identifications will occur;
and (2) in appropriate cases, trial
judges should consider allowing

expert witness testimony and providing eyewitness specific jury instructions to help jurors better understand
the circumstances that may affect the
accuracy of eyewitness identification
evidence.
A third avenue, to modify existing
standards and procedures so that trial
judges will be more likely to suppress
unduly suggestive and unreliable
eyewitness identifications, is unlikely
to to happen in Maryland in light of
the Court of Appeals recent decision
in Smiley v. State, No. 37 SEPT. TERM
2014, 2015 WL 1000055 (Md. Mar. 9,
2015). In a unanimous decision, the
Court of Appeals affirmed its nearly 30-year-old standard that photo
identifications be admitted unless the
police procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to make the identification unreliable.
A. Improving Pre-trial Police
Procedures
The Innocence Project notes that
ten states have implemented the
1999 reforms published by the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ),
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for
Law Enforcement (1999) (available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/178240.pdf), a set of voluntary
guidelines for eyewitness investigations by law enforcement. According
to the Innocence Project, these procedures have been shown to significantly decrease misidentifications.
The Causes of Wrongful Conviction,
Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongfulconviction (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
The Innocence Project reports that
Maryland has already taken steps to
reduce and remedy wrongful convictions: law enforcement units that
regularly use interrogation rooms
capable of creating audiovisual

recordings must make reasonable
efforts to record custodial interrogations for certain crimes (see Md. Code
Ann., Crim. Proc. 2-402); a person
convicted of murder, manslaughter,
or certain sexual offenses may be
eligible for post-conviction DNA testing; biological evidence must be preserved for certain criminal cases; and
the Board of Public Works determines
compensation packages for pardoned
individuals wrongfully convicted
(see Md. State Fin. & Proc. 10-501).
Maryland, Innocence Project, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/how-isyour-state-doing/MD (last visited
Mar. 8, 2015).
In 2014, the Maryland General
Assembly took another important
step by enacting legislation requiring all law enforcement agencies in
the state to adopt and implement
policies to improve pre-trial policeconducted eyewitness identification
procedures. Each law enforcement
agency within the state has until
January 1, 2016, to adopt the Police
Training Commission’s Eyewitness
Identification Model Policy or to
adopt and implement its own policy that complies with Md. Code
Ann., Public Safety § 3-506.1. The
Department of State Police will then
compile the written policies and
allow public inspection. Md. Code
Ann., Public Safety § 3-506; Public
Safety—Eyewitness Identification—
Procedures, 2014 Maryland Laws Ch.
202 (H.B. 1200).
The new legislation has some
shortcomings and leaves many
questions unanswered, among
them: After the Department of State
Police compiles the written policies and allows public inspection,
which agency, if any, will be tasked
with making sure that the policies
are implemented, how much time

will be allowed for implementation, and what authority will this
agency have?; What penalties, if
any, will be imposed for failure(s)
to abide by the new legislation?;
What resources will be available to
local law enforcement agencies to
implement the new policies?; What
type of and how much training
will be required to make sure that
the procedures are properly implemented, who will provide the training, and how will the training be
conducted?; Will these procedures
be applied to serious felonies, all
felonies, or all cases?
Also, while sequential line-ups and
sequential photo line-ups are discussed in the DOJ Guidelines (see
supra at 34), they are not addressed
in the recently enacted Maryland legislation. According to the Guidelines,
“Scientific research indicates that
identification procedures such as
lineups and photo arrays produce
more reliable evidence when the
individual lineup members or photographs are shown to the witness
sequentially – one at a time – rather
than simultaneously.” (see Guidelines
at 9). Some, but not all, Maryland law
enforcement agencies currently use
sequential methods of presentation.
B. Trial Safeguards
• Expert Witnesses
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority in Perry v. New Hampshire,
stated that the admission of expert testimony helps jurors evaluate eyewitness identifications and safeguards
defendants against misidentification.
565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 716, 729 (2012).
The Court noted that some states
allow defendants to present expert
testimony on this evidence. Id. (citing
State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, A33, 223
P.3d. 1103, 113)(“We expect…that in

cases involving eyewitness identification of strangers or near-strangers, trial courts will routinely admit
expert testimony [on the dangers of
such evidence.]”).
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting in
Perry v. New Hampshire, responded to
the majority’s reliance on the jury to
determine the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence: “…[O]
ur cases are rooted in the assumption
that eyewitness identifications upend
the ordinary expectation that it is
‘the province of the jury to weigh the
credibility of competing witnesses’….
As noted, jurors find eyewitness evidence unusually powerful and their
ability to assess credibility is hindered by a witness’ false confidence
in the accuracy of his or her identification.” 132 S.Ct 716, 737.
Maryland judges have often
declined to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identifications.
Interestingly, in the Kirk Bloodsworth
case in 1986, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in declining
to admit expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications
given the discretion of trial judges
in the admission of expert testimony.
Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 186,
512 A.2d 1056, 1067 (1986). The trial
judge feared that the evidence would
confuse or mislead the jury and that
it would be of little value in helping
the jury understand the evidence. Id.
at 178, 512 A.2d at 1063.
More recently, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland upheld the trial court’s
refusal to admit expert testimony on
(1) the lack of correlation between a
witness’s confidence and accuracy
of that witness’s identification on
the grounds that it offered nothing
of value to the jury, (2) the adverse
affect of the passage of time on
July 2015
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a witness’s ability to recall memories on the grounds that it is common knowledge, and (3) the adverse
affect of stress on one’s recollection
of memories on the grounds that
it would be confusing to the jury.
Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 398, 421-22,
987 A.3d 98, 115 (2010).
Furthermore, in Smiley v. State,
No. 37 SEPT. TERM 2014, 2015 WL
1000055 (Md. Mar. 9, 2015), the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Court of Special Appeals, 216 Md.
App. 1, 84 A.3d 190 (2014) and upheld
the trial court’s refusal to allow expert
witnesses to testify on scientific
knowledge concerning memory. The
Court of Appeals declined to adopt
the theories and methodologies of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State
v. Henderson, supra, either as a matter of State constitutional or evidentiary law. Id. at *7. However, the court
declared that “trial courts should recognize these scientific advances in
exercising their discretion whether to
admit such expert testimony in a particular case.” Id. at *13 (quoting Bomas
v. State, 412 Md. at 416, 987 A.2d at
112 (2010).
• Eyewitness
Specific
Jury
Instructions
Eyewitness Specific Jury Instructions
The court in Henderson v. State
stated that expert testimony might
be less necessary with the use of
focused eyewitness identification
jury instructions. 208 N.J 208, 219, 27
A.3d 872, 878 (2011). An important
judicial function is educating the
jury through the use of jury instructions. Currently, Maryland cases do
not recognize the need to inform
jurors of specific factors that may
affect the reliability of eyewitness
identifications. A judge need not
give a requested instruction if he/
32
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she believes the matter is already
covered by instructions given. Md.
Rule 4-325; see e.g. Gunning v. State,
374 Md. 332, 701 A.2d 374 (1997).
Maryland judges often choose not to
give these jury instructions because
they classify certain eyewitness identification issues as “common sense.”
See e.g. Smiley v. State, 216 Md. App.
1, 38, 84 A.3d 190, 211-12 (2014), aff’d
No. 37 SEPT. TERM 2014, 2015 WL
1000055, n. 11 (Md. Mar. 9, 2015).
Henderson, however, requires trial
judges, in appropriate circumstances, to instruct juries on factors that
increase the risk of eyewitness misidentifications. Henderson v. State,
208 N.J 208, 27 A.3d 872 (2011). The
court appointed a Special Master
who submitted a report on her
findings on eyewitness identifications that the court used to create
its model instructions. See State v.
Henderson, N.J. Supreme Court, No.
A-8-08 (Special Master’s Report).
Two years later, the United States
Supreme Court in Perry v. New
Hampshire recognized the importance of these instructions. While
refusing to enlarge the domain of
Due Process, the Court specifically noted that eyewitness-specific
jury instructions, adopted by many
courts as safeguards built into the
system, prevent juries from putting
too much weight on eyewitness testimony. 132 S.Ct. 716, 729 (2012).
In Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470
Mass. 352, 22 N.E.3d 897 (2015),
the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to give the defendant’s proferred eyewitness identification jury instructions. However,
with the guidance of the Report and
Recommendations of the Supreme

Judicial Court Study Group on
Eyewitness Evidence (July 25,
2013) (Study Group Report), available at http:///www.mass.gov/
courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitnessevidence-report-2013.pdf, the court
concluded “that there are scientific
principles regarding eyewitness
identification that are ‘so generally
accepted’ that it is appropriate in
the future to instruct juries regarding these principles so that they
may apply the principles in their
evaluation of eyewitness identification evidence.” 470 Mass. at 354, 22
N.E.3d at 900. In an unusual turn,
the court included as an Appendix
to its opinion a provisional jury
instruction regarding eyewitness
identification evidence. . Id. at 354,
22 N.E.3d at 900-01.
In light of the recently published
Gomes opinion and one of the coauthors recently published preGomes instructions for Maryland, the
authors recommend the following
proposed model jury instructions
for Maryland trial judges to consider
in appropriate cases. These instructions are based on integrating some
of the provisional jury instructions
in Gomes with the co-author’s published jury instructions, especially
§ 2.56, Identification of Defendant
by Eyewitnesses. See related jury
instructions: § 2.57(A), Identification
of Defendant by Single Eyewitness;
§ 2.61, Photographic Identification;
§ 2.62, Identification Based on
Defendant’s “Mug Shots”: No
inference to be Drawn from Police
Possession; § 2.23, Credibility of
Witnesses; and § 2.57(B), Cross-Racial
Identification of Defendant. David
E. Aaronson, Maryland Criminal
Jury Instructions and Commentary
(2014-2015 ed., LexisNexis). See
also David E. Aaronson, Cross-

Racial Identification of Defendants in
Criminal Cases: A Proposed Model Jury
Instruction, 23 Crim. Just. 4 (2008).
The bracketed language in the
following instruction should be used
only when the facts of the case suggest that the additional guidance may
be helpful to the jurors.
• Proposed Model Jury Instruction
on Eyewitness Identification of
Defendant
You have heard evidence regarding the identification of the
defendant(s) as the person(s) who
committed the crime. The burden
is on the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt not only that the
offense(s) [was] [were] committed,
but also that ______________(insert
name(s) of defendant(s)) (is)(are)
the person(s) who committed (it)
(them).
You must determine whether the eyewitness testimony
of_________________ (insert name(s)
of eyewitness(es)) (is) (are) both truthful and accurate. You may consider
any evidence relating to (his)(her)
(their) identification(s), including
to what extent any witness’s testimony should be believed.
A number of factors may affect the
accuracy of an identification of the
defendant by an alleged eyewitness. To decide whether the identification testimony is sufficiently
reliable evidence, you may consider the following factors: [Include,
if applicable, the following factors:]
1. The witness’s opportunity to
observe the criminal act(s) and
the person(s) committing it
(them) including:
a. the length of the encounter;
b. the distance between the

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.
h.

various parties;
the witness’s eyesight and
the lighting conditions at the
time;
the witness’s state of mind
at the time of the offense
[including the use of alcohol
or drugs by the witness];
the witness’s degree of
attention to the perpetrator
during the commission of
the offense;
[whether the perpetrator
had a distinctive face or feature;]
[any disguises worn by the
perpetrator];
the accuracy of any prior
description of the person
committing the offense given
by the witness, including
any discrepancies between
the prior description and the
defendant’s actual description; and

i. whether the witness previously knew or had seen
the person committing the
offense before the incident
or before the identification.
[Prior exposure to a person
can help a witness recognize
that person. But it can also
lead to a mistaken identification if the witness confuses people (he)(she) saw at
different time(s) or place(s).
You should consider how
many times the witness
had seen the defendant and
under what circumstances. It is for you to decide
whether the prior contact
between the witness and the
defendant makes the witness identification more
accurate, less accurate, or
had no effect.]
2. You heard testimony that
July 2015

Maryland Bar Journal

33

or
the
procedure].

identification

4. [Any failure of a witness to
make identification, or a misidentification by the witness].
5. [If you determine that
__________’s
(insert
name
of
witness(es))
out-of-court
identification(s) is(are) not reliable, you may still consider
___________’s (insert name of
witness(es)) in-court identification if you find that to be reliable. However, unless the identification here in court resulted
from ________’s (insert name of
witness(es)) observation(s) or
perception(s) of a perpetrator
during the commission of an
offense rather than being the
product of an impression gained
at an out-of-court identification procedure such as a (lineup)(photo lineup), it should be
afforded no weight. The ultimate
issues of the trustworthiness of
both in-court and out-of-court
identifications are for you, the
jury to decide.]
_____________ (insert name(s) of
witness(es)) made a statement at
the time (he) (she)(they) identified the defendant about (his)
(her)(their)level of certainty that
the (person)(person shown in the
photograph) is, in fact, the person who committed the crime.
In general, a witness’s level of
confidence may or may not be
an indication of the reliability of
the identification. It is for you
to determine, based on all of the
circumstances in evidence, how
much weight to give to the witness’s level of confidence.

34
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3. Any earlier or later identification by the witness that occurred
out of court and the circumstances surrounding that identification, including:
a. the length of time that
elapsed between the crime
and the identification;
b. the witness’s state of mind
when making the identification;
c. any suggestive circumstances
that may have influenced
the witness [and any
statements or actions by
law enforcement officers
concerning the identification

6. [You heard evidence that a
weapon was involved in the commission of the alleged crime(s)
of ______________ (insert alleged
criminal offense(s)), namely a
_______________ (insert type of
weapon alleged to be used). You
must decide whether the witness saw this weapon during the
incident and the circumstances
surrounding the witness’s perception of the weapon. In general, a weapon can distract the
witness and take the witness’s
attention away from the perpetrator’s face, particularly if the

weapon is directed at the witness. As a result, if the crime is
of short duration, the presence of
a visible weapon may reduce the
accuracy of identification. In longer events, this distraction may
decrease as the witness adapts
to the presence of the weapon
and focuses on other details. It is
solely for you to determine, considering all the facts and circumstances in evidence, whether a
weapon did distract the witness
and, if so, how much weight to
give to this factor.]
7.[Another factor to consider
about the accuracy of a witness’s perception is stress or
fear. Although moderate levels
of stress may improve focus in
some circumstances, high levels of stress or fear can have a
negative effect on a witness’s
ability to make an accurate
identification.]
8. [When the witness and the perpetrator are of a different race,
see David Aaronson, Maryland
Criminal Jury Instruction and
Commentary (2014-2015 ed.,
LexisNexis) § 2.57(B), Cross-Racial
Identification of Defendant.]
9. Any other factors that have
been brought to your attention
[by (expert testimony; other] and
any evidence that you conclude
bears upon the accuracy of the
witness’s in-court or out-of court
identification of the defendant.
You may consider any other
direct or circumstantial evidence
that may be relevant to the identification of the person who committed the offense(s) charged
and either supports or does not

support the identification by the
witness(es).
[When the evidence raises
a question about whether the
defendant was the person who
committed the alleged crime(s),
the identification of the defendant by a single eyewitness, if
believed beyond a reasonable
doubt, can be sufficient evidence
of defendant’s identification.]
You must scrutinize the evidence relating to the identification of the defendant with
great care. You may consider the
credibility or lack of credibility
of the identifying witness, all
of the circumstances surrounding a witness’s identification of
the defendant, and any other
facts and circumstances that you
deem relevant to determine the
reliability of the identification.
You alone are to decide whether
(a)(any) witness[es] [has] [have]
adequately identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the
offense. The weight and sufficiency to be given to identification testimony is a matter solely
for your determination.
While this proposed jury instruction is more detailed than those
generally used, it is much easier for
a trial judge to modify or delete language from a pattern jury instruction when it is not needed than to
draft a more detailed instruction
when it is needed.

Courts, legislatures, police departments, prosecutors, the defense bar,
and legal scholars are assessing the
implications for the criminal justice
system. Mistaken eyewitness identifications are the leading cause of
wrongful convictions, playing the
primary role in nearly three-quarters
of post-conviction DNA exonerations in the United States.
Building on legislation enacted
in Maryland in 2014, police departments should be encouraged to
adopt and implement the best practices when conducting eyewitness
pre-trial identification procedures.
At trial, judges should consider admitting expert testimony in
appropriate cases to better educate
jurors on factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications.
Also, detailed jury instructions,
such as the proposed model jury
instructions recommended above,
may better educate jurors on the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications and reduce
the need for expert testimony. Taken
together, the above steps can reduce
wrongful convictions based on mistaken eyewitness identifications in
Maryland.
Mr. Aaronson is a Professor of Law at the
Washington College of Law, American
University, and a past chair of the MSBA
Criminal Law and Practice Section, and
currently serves as an ex officio member. He may be reached at daarons@
wcl.american.edu. Ms. Fox is a graduate
(J.D. 2015) of the Washington College of
Law, American University. She served as
Professor Aaronson’s research assistant as
a second and third year law student.

Conclusion
As a result of 30 years of scientific
research and thousands of studies, a
scientific consensus exists on many
of the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications.
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